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RISK SHARING AND CONSUMPTION INSURANCE IN POOR URBAN
ECONOMIES: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM
HOUSEHOLD DATA

Seife Dendir, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2005

Households in poor economies often strive to protect consumption from
fluctuations in income through various mechanisms. Due to the absence or scarcity o f
formal insurance, however, they are often forced to rely on informal means to achieve
this objective. This dissertation consists o f three essays that analyze the nature,
performance and instruments o f risk sharing and consumption insurance in poor
urban areas.
The first essay identifies the peculiar problems poor urban households face in
their attempt to pool risk from idiosyncratic income swings, and derives unique
results pertaining to the level o f insurance and effort. Two specific problems are
identified: lack o f commitment due to the unavailability of institutions that enforce
contracts, and moral hazard arising from unobservable effort in production. The
premise is that information problems o f the latter type cannot be ignored in poor
urban areas because o f the relatively loose societal structure. This is in addition to the
ubiquitous enforcement problem. A model o f risk sharing under double moral hazard
and lack o f enforcement is proposed and the inefficiencies that occur relative to the
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first-best are analyzed. Results show that the deviation from the first best insurance is
greatest in the presence of both commitment and moral hazard problems.
Interestingly, optimal effort levels under moral hazard and limited commitment are
higher than those under moral hazard only.
The second and third essays use extensive survey data to empirically examine
risk sharing and consumption insurance in poor urban areas. The second essay adopts
consumption based tests to assess the hypothesis, as implied by the theoretical model,
that there is significant deviation from complete insurance. In addition to least
squares, Generalized Method o f Moments estimation that controls for endogeneity
and measurement error problems is employed. The estimates for various consumption
types and income source groups forcefully reject the full insurance null. Further tests
reveal that partial insurance occurs among the most vulnerable, and that households
may better insure consumption against unemployment than sickness induced shocks.
Consumption based tests indicate the extent to which households are able to
insure consumption without being informative about the means adopted. The third
essay focuses on examining the instruments o f insurance. In particular, it investigates
whether households in poor urban areas use private transfers and informal loans as
mechanisms o f risk sharing and insurance. Pooled and random effects ordered probit
estimates show that, despite households’ reported use o f both private transfers and
informal credit mostly for augmenting consumption, only transfer receipts respond to
proxies o f income shock and vulnerability. Loans appear to serve a different purpose,
presumably not insurance, where repayment considerations, not income risks, matter.
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INTRODUCTION
Issues relating to risk sharing and consumption insurance have received much attention
since the early 1990s. Due to the absence o f formal insurance and financial markets, and
the significant income risks that households in developing countries frequently face, most
o f the literature has focused on analyzing issues pertaining to developing areas. In
particular, the emphasis has been on rural developing economies. This may be partly
explained by some naturally occurring conditions that are favorable to risk sharing in
rural areas: information flow is relatively good; closely-knit societal arrangements
discourage shirking behavior; and insurance communities are presumably easier to
identify. The emphasis may also be partly explained by availability o f data, which often
take the form o f targeted household surveys in village economies.

In this light, investigating risk sharing and consumption insurance exclusively in the
context o f poor urban areas is a worthwhile and novel exercise. Such an examination is
particularly warranted because (a) in poor urban economies, formal insurance and
financial markets are largely absent or thin, implying that households in these areas are in
a relatively similar position to their rural counterparts when it comes to vulnerability to
income risk; and (b) there are peculiarities to urban livelihood, specifically the relatively
loose social structure with limited information flow that potentially hinder informal risk
sharing. That households, so challenged by poverty and income risks, successfully
workout some form o f consumption insurance is indeed surprising. This dissertation
attempts to study such arrangements.

The dissertation comprises three essays that investigate the nature, performance and
means o f risk sharing and consumption insurance in poor urban economies. The first
essay identifies the unique problems that households in these areas face in risk sharing
endeavors— namely

lack

o f contract enforcement and

moral hazard— and

the

implications for insurance and effort levels. The second essay assesses, using extensive
survey data, the effectiveness o f risk sharing attempts by poor urban households in
shielding consumption from income fluctuations. The third essay tries to identify the

1
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main instruments o f informal risk sharing in these areas, especially between private
transfers and/or informal credit, again using nationally representative urban survey data.
Overall, this dissertation studies informal risk sharing and insurance in poor urban
economies. In doing so, it derives important predictions from a theoretical assessment o f
the likely scenarios in which such arrangements operate, and presents empirical results
regarding overall performance and relative adoption o f specific instruments.

2
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ESSAY I
MORAL HAZARD, LIMITED COMMITMENT AND RISK SHARING IN POOR
URBAN ECONOMIES
Introduction
Insuring consumption against fluctuations in income is an important objective o f
households. Idiosyncratic shocks to income that may occur due to involuntary job loss,
sickness, death in the household and other undesirable events may translate into
consumption shocks if there is no risk sharing. For this, households in both developed
and developing countries engage in different types o f risk-sharing arrangements. In the
developed world, financial markets and instruments make it possible for households to
achieve reasonable consumption smoothing. In contrast, the absence o f markets forces
households in developing countries to engage in various informal risk-sharing networks,
which include altruistic family and non-family transfers, informal loan markets, labor and
other resource sharing arrangements, and village level associations like rotating savings
and credit associations.

The past decade has witnessed a fairly large literature investigating how far households in
developing countries are able to protect consumption from adverse shocks and the role of
informal networks. Despite the relative importance o f such networks in striving to shield
household consumption, information and commitment problems significantly hamper
their functioning.1 In particular, the literature has recognized the detrimental effects o f
limited commitment (or enforceability) on risk-sharing contracts in rural areas o f
developing countries. In most cases, however, information problems have been relegated
to the backseat presumably because the closely-knit societal structure o f rural households
allows easy access to information.

1 Because households can only partially insure through such networks, they often complement these
arrangements with other self-insuring mechanisms. These include own savings (often through accumulation
o f assets) and ex ante income smoothing measures like the choice of low-yielding yet low-risk income
sources, sending of family members to geographically (and occupationally) dispersed areas, and
involvement in secondary income generating activities (see Morduch, 1995 and Hoogeveen, 2001 for a
review).

3
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In this light, the situation o f households in urban (semi-urban) areas o f developing
countries is at best precarious. On the one hand, thin formal financial markets imply
households cannot rely on their services to smooth consumption. On the other hand, lack
o f close kinship implies that the problem o f asymmetric information cannot be ignored.
This is in addition to the perpetual problem o f limited enforceability. The twin problems
— moral hazard and limited commitment — render informal networks less effective in
enabling households to share risks.

In this paper we propose and characterize a simple model o f risk sharing when both
moral hazard and limited commitment problems are present and analyze the different
inefficiencies that occur relative to the first-best. The moral hazard problem arises
because households engaging in risk sharing face incentives to choose lower effort in
individual production when their effort is not observable to their partner. The
commitment problem refers to the lack o f third party legal institutions that enforce
contracts in these areas and hence the need for risk-sharing arrangements to be selfenforcing.

The relevance o f various informal risk-sharing networks in the developing world is well
noted. In some areas gifts, transfers and remittances are shown to be one major means of
achieving consumption smoothing (Fafchamps, 1992; Ravallion and Deardon, 1988; Cox
and Jimenez, 1998; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Zero interest
and interest yielding informal credit with contingent repayment are found to be another
(Udry, 1990 and 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). In rural areas, labor and other
resource sharing networks help households survive through health or other negative
shocks (Platteau, 1997). Rotating savings and credit associations also serve insurance
purposes in both rural and urban developing areas (Besley, 1995).

In addition, the risk sharing and insurance literature has duly noted the adverse effects of
lack o f enforcement in informal insurance arrangements. Kimball (1988) and Coate and
Ravallion (1993) use a stationary model (where transfers are determined by current
incomes only) to formally discuss the deviation from full-insurance due to enforcement

4
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concerns on the part o f risk-sharing partners. Kocherlakota (1996) extends the model
with enforcement problem to incorporate the role played by repayment histories
(dynamic limited commitment), and proposes a way of empirically distinguishing
between commitment problems versus asymmetric information as causes for departures
from first-best arrangements. Ligon et al (2002) present an explicit characterization o f the
dynamic commitment model and provide tests o f consumption model fits. Similar
dynamic limited commitment models have been extended to allow for self-insurance
through savings (Ligon et al, 2000) and altruism (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001).

Similarly, information problems and their effects on risk sharing have received attention
in the literature. Among others, Thomas and Worral (1990) discuss the efficient contract
between a risk neutral lender and a risk-averse borrower with unobservable income.
Atkeson and Lucas (1992) study the dynamics o f consumption under unobservable taste
shocks and find that inequality increases over time in an efficient allocation. Wang
(1995) characterizes an efficient contract in a dynamic insurance model with bilateral
asymmetric information (unobservable endowments). Ligon (1998) derives restrictions
that can be used to distinguish between different consumption regimes, and finds that the
one under private information does the most explanation empirically.

In the approach to analyzing income transfer arrangements, our work closely relates to
Coate and Ravallion (1993). In a symmetric two-household framework, they analyze the
potential problem o f ex post reneging on contract agreements in economies where there
are no third party legal institutions. In doing so, they characterize the optimal insurance
arrangement that is implementable and identify conditions that determine distortions
relative to the first best. Our model is similar to theirs in its stationary nature. However,
their model does not have production (effort) and is based on random and exogenous
income draws. Our model introduces the role o f effort in income realizations and treats
the consequent incentive problem in a bilateral moral hazard framework. Therefore,
while our work is a simultaneous treatment o f moral hazard and limited commitment,
Coate and Ravallion (1993) treat the latter problem only. As noted above, the literature
often assumes away information problems in village economies due to close social

5
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contacts. We argue that this is not the case in urban/semi-urban areas. The social structure
means information problems are highly relevant and this is the primary motivation behind
this paper in treating both issues—moral hazard and limited commitment— in the context
o f informal insurance arrangements.

We find some interesting results from the treatment o f information and commitment
problems together. First, optimal effort levels under risk sharing are inferior to the firstbest levels. These results are due to the moral hazard problem. And effort levels are lower
when the insurance contract stipulates a larger transfer amount. Second, the optimal
transfer under moral hazard is inferior to the full information contract. When
commitment problems are introduced in addition to moral hazard, the transfer is smaller
compared to that under moral hazard only (and, by implication, further below the firstbest level). An interesting and surprising result is that optimal effort levels under moral
hazard and limited commitment are higher than those under moral hazard only. It seems
that incentive concerns are partially offset by the presence o f enforcement problems.

Model
Overview
We consider two households A and B dwelling in an urban (semi-urban) setting in a
developing country. Both households are risk-averse and would like to smooth
consumption in the face o f idiosyncratic income shocks. To this effect, they engage in an
income transfer arrangement where, depending on the realization o f individual states, the
lucky household makes a transfer to the not-so-lucky household.

For simplicity, assume there are only two states that can be realized by each household.
In the high state, household A earns yf, and in the low state it earns y f . Similarly, B
earns y B
H in the high state a n d y fin the low state. Without loss o f generality, assume
that y A
H = y „B and y A
L = y \ . That is, similar states yield identical income levels across
households. The probability that the high state occurs for household A is given b y ^ ,
implying the low state occurs with probability! -<j)A . The corresponding probabilities for

6
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B are given b y ^ 5 andl -(f>B. For each household, the probability^ is a function o f own
effort. We assume that the two households engage in production independently and that
there is no direct effect o f one’s effort on the other’s probability o f realizing a given state.
Denoting household A ’s effort by a and B ’s b y e , </>A = ^ ( a ) a n d 0 s = <f>B(e). We assume
that <2^ > 0 ,^f > 0 , 0 Aa < 0 a n d ^ < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivates.2 The
assumptions imply that increasing effort increases the probability o f realizing the high
income state but it does so at a decreasing rate. Given effort levels, idiosyncratic
(uncorrelated) random shocks determine the occurrence o f a state, implying state
realizations are independent across households. We assume there is no storage in this
model.

The risk-sharing contract stipulates an ex post transfer amount 0 ^ from the high income
to the low income household in case o f contrasting fortunes between the two. Because o f
theassumption that realized incomes in similar states are equal for the two households,
we expect a zero transfer amount in case similar fortunes are observed. Given such a
contract, the per-period expected utility for household A and B, denoted V and U , can be
given as follows.

V(a,e,6HL) = </>A{aW{e)v(yA
H)+</>A{ a il- tB{e)y(yA
H-<9ffl)+ (l~ <fiA{a))fiB{e)v(yA
L + 0HL)
+( \- r { a ) ll-r { e ) y M - G { a )

(1)

and
U { e , a , 0 HL ) = 0 A {a)0 B [ e p { y B
H )+ 0 A( 4

- * B{ e )) j{ y B
L + 0 HL ) + (l - 0 A {a))t>B { e p [ y B
H - 0 HL)

+ (l - 0A{a)l1- 0B[e])j{yB
L)-F(e)

(2)

G(a)andF(e) represent disutility o f effort functions for A and B. We assume that
Ga > 0,Fe > 0,Gaa > 0 and Fee > 0; that is, higher effort levels increase disutility and do so
at an increasing rate. V(-) and £/(•) represent utility as a function o f net income for A and
B, with V'(-) > 0 , U'(-) > 0 , F"( ) < 0 and (/"(■) < 0. The first and fourth terms in (1) depict
the expected utility components for household A when both households realize high and

2 These are standard assumptions in the moral hazard literature.

7
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low income, respectively; these are cases in which no transfers are made. The second
term shows a situation where A realizes high income, B realizes low income, and A
makes a transfer to B; the third term depicts the reverse situation. A similar explanation
applies to the expected utility components o f household B in (2).

Income realizations are assumed to be observable to both households and this is the basis
o f the transfer arrangement. However, neither household is able to observe the other’s
effort level. Such hidden actions give rise to a two-sided moral hazard problem whereby
knowledge o f potential future transfers may induce each household to choose a lower
effort level. This is often the situation in urban (semi-urban) areas o f developing
countries where the relatively loose societal structure (especially compared to closelyknit societies o f rural villages) implies information asymmetries in effort levels are
impossible to ignore.

In addition to moral hazard, we have an enforcement problem. In these economies, the
absence o f written contracts and/or third party legal institutions that enforce them entail
defection concerns. For example, in our model, a fortunate household may decide to
renege on the contract and walk away without making a transfer to the less fortunate
household. This necessitates such contracts in these economies to be self-enforcing.

To analyze these issues, we consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the households
select the transfer level that will be stipulated in the contract. Given this transfer level,
the second stage o f the problem is a Coumot-Nash situation that requires each household
to choose its optimal effort level taking the other’s effort as given. The enforcement
problem is captured by adding a ‘No defection’ constraint in the first stage o f the
problem.3

In approaching the problem, first we solve for the optimal effort levels in the second
stage o f the game for an arbitrary transfer level. This yields the optimal effort levels as a
3 Such two-stage games are employed to analyze, among others, capacity-price competition, location
choice, and product warranties in industrial organization theory (see Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983;
D ’Aspremont et al, 1979; Cooper and Ross, 1985).

8
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function o f the arbitrary (fixed) transfer. Then, we use the reduced form effort functions
to obtain the optimal transfer in the first stage o f the game.

Effort Choice by Partner Households: Bilateral Moral Hazard
Before treating the two-sided moral hazard problem, we start with the benchmark case o f
effort choice under full-information. In such a case, the households choose optimal effort
levels by maximizing joint (social) utility, W , given as the sum o f individual expected
utilities. This is done for an arbitrary transfer level.
MaxW = V(a,e,9HL)+U(a,e,9HL)

(3)

a te

The first order conditions for this problem are then:
Va +Ua = 0 ,a n d

(4)

ve+ue = 0 .

(5)

The pair (a*, e*) that solves this system represents the first-best effort levels.

In contrast, the condition that effort o f either household is unobservable implies each
household chooses its optimal effort level given some conjecture about the other’s effort.
In this stage o f the game, both households do so taking the transfer level from stage 1 as
given. Accordingly, household A maximizes V to choose a (taking e as given) and B
maximizes U to choose

e (taking

a as given). The first order conditions under

unobservable effort are then given as:
For household A,

K=

V V^H)- v(yt + 0HL)]+(l - r 1v(yA- eHL)- v(yA
L)}- Ga = 0,

(6)

and, for household B,
Ue

M y ? ,) - u { y l

+ eHL)]+ (l - 4AM y ? , - em) - c/(y ? )}- Fe = 0

(7)

9
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Clearly, a quick look at the first order conditions o f the full-information problem and
those under moral hazard reveals that resulting effort levels under the latter are suboptimal. This is the case since neither household takes into account the benefits that
accrue to the other household from increasing own effort.

The two first-order conditions under bilateral moral hazard determine the effort reaction
functions for households A and B. For a given transfer

, the reaction functions can be

denoted as a{e\ 0UL) ande(a; dnL) 4 Together they determine the optimal Nash-equilibrium
(second-best) effort levels, (a, e), for the two households.5 From the first order conditions,
the slopes o f the reaction functions can be shown to be:

For household A,

de

Iv{yA
„ )- v{yj + 0IIL))+ ( l - ^ \v(y* - 0HL)~ v{yA
L)]}

Gm

do

M

r M -

(8)

+ d„L1- K y» - e«L)- y{yi 1

and, for household B

u{yB
L+
do Fee - ^ ^ | y{y* )~u{yB
L + dHL)] + (l -

enL)-u{yl)[}
[u{yB
H- dHL) - U { y f )]}

de_

Lemma 1:

de
da

<0 and

(9)

'*r<a
da

Proof. Taking the effort reaction function for A, it is clear that the term in the curly
brackets in the numerator is positive. Since ^ is concave and G is convex in effort, this
makes

the

numerator positive.

Furthermore,

by the concavity

o f the

utility

4 We assume that a(0; 0HL ) > 0 and e(0; 0HI) > 0 .
5 We assume the Nash Equilibrium exists and is unique. Concavity o f expected utility with respect to effort
insures existence. Uniqueness/stability requires

' de_
Kda

< 1, for i=A,B. We only consider pure strategy

equilibrium.

10
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function, v(y£) -

v(yA
L+0HL)< v [)>h -

0HL) - v{yA), making the denominator negative.6

Similar arguments apply for B ’s reaction function. ■

That the reaction functions are negatively sloped makes intuitive sense. In the partnership
arrangement, each household can free-ride on the other’s effort level and, all else equal,
this is captured as a reduction in own effort in response to an increase in the other’s effort
level. This and the reaction function equilibrium are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Effort Reaction Function Equilibrium
e

eia-,0.

a

Furthermore, from the first order conditions in (6) and (7), we can compute the effects o f
changing the transfer amount on the second-best effort levels:
da

Mhl

e"L

\t>B[v{yA
H)- v[yU 0HL)f+ (l-V ) t o - 0hl)- v{yA
L)J-Gaa

and
de

■~e0

~dd~
HI

Lemma 2:

€ V b (y « ) - u { e HL) H i - V \ u U - eHL) - u[yB
Lj f - Fee'
&hi

<0 and e„
Vui < 0.

’ This is easier to see after rearranging terms :

) - v {y fj - 0HL) < v ( y A + dHL) - v { y A ).
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Proof: Using arguments in Lemma 1, the denominators are negative, and nonsatiation
( V'( ) > 0, [/'(•) > 0 ) implies the numerators are positive. ■

An increase in magnitude o f the transfer induces each household to decrease the privately
optimal effort level. This is essentially what the moral hazard problem is about.
Expecting a positive transfer amount in case o f an adverse shock to income, households
tend to shirk in production. The higher the transfer amount, the effort level that they exert
would be further reduced, ex ante.

Transfer under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment
The second stage o f the game characterized above gives the optimal effort levels for an
arbitrary transfer amount, denoted a{dHL) and e(0HL). Given these optimal effort levels, in
the first stage o f the game players choose the optimal transfer amount. Here, we initially
characterize the first-stage problem in the absence o f commitment concerns. Accordingly,
each household maximizes its per-period utility subject to effort levels equal
to a{0HL) ande(0ffl) .Substituting

a{dHL) and

e(dHL) into each household’s objective

function and using the envelope theorem, the first order conditions for the first stage
game can be shown to be:

V (v{yA„)- V(yA - eHL))+ (l -

= K l = ^ % ,L

- ^ (l ■-0s y'(yA - e HL)- (l ■-

lv(y? + eHL)- v(y A))]

({ 2)

y r ( y t + eHL)}= 0

for household A, and

~~ -

k W h ) - u{y‘H - eHL))+ (l - / \u (yB
L + 0HL)- u(y ?))]

ouHL

- fl - <t,A)/>BU'{yB
H - eHL)-<t>A(\-<l>B)j'(yl + eHL)}= 0
for household B.7

7 The asterisk on U and V shows that second-best effort levels from the second stage are applied.
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In both (12) and (13), the terms in the square brackets (along with the multiplicative
facto r^/e6/iL) capture the incentive effect o f the contract and the terms in the curly
brackets capture the insurance effect. If effort was observable, eg - 0 , we would be left
with the insurance effect only, and it can be easily seen that the transfer amount equals
the first-best (under symmetric probabilities).8 This leads us to the next proposition.

Proposition 1
(a) Under moral hazard (and symmetric probabilities), the optimal transfer is
positive but less than the first-best.
(b) There is a trade-off between the incentive problem and insurance.

Proof, (a) From the first-order condition for household A, when 0UL = 0 the incentive
effect vanishes and concavity o f utility ensures that V f > 0 (that is, the insurance effect
is positive). This implies a positive transfer level is optimal. W hen0UL > 0 , the incentive
effect

is

always

negative

and

for

the

first-order

conditions

to

be

satisfied, V'[yA
L + 0,IL)> V'{y(, - 0 HL). This inequality implies the optimal transfer is less
than the first best,(y„ - y L) / 2 , which would prevail only if V'[yA
L + 0HL)= V'{yf, - dHL).
The same arguments work for B.
(b) If
^

e# is large, denoting a stronger incentive effect, the disparity between
+ @IIL) and f [y?! ~ @1!L) should increase for the first-order condition to be satisfied.

This drives the optimal insurance further below the first-best level. The same argument
works for B. ■

This proposition states that despite the double moral hazard problem, a positive transfer
level (though strictly less than the first best) is always optimal. We denote this optimal
transfer level under moral hazard only as dHL .

8 The first-best transfer amount here refers to the one that would be attained under observable effort and
*
y n ~ yL
.
binding commitment. It can be shown that this is given by 0HL = -----
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The intuition here is that full insurance is not incentive compatible. In order to induce the
other partner to undertake proper effort, the transfer offer must incorporate “reward” in
the high state and “penalty” in the low state. The above inequality ensures just that and
the deviation from the first-best is entirely due to the magnitude o f the incentive effect, as
seen from equations (12) and (13).

Next we include the enforcement problem. When there is an enforcement problem
because households renege on contract stipulations after the realization o f income, the
transfer level in the first stage ought to discourage defection. That is, the choice o f
optimal transfer should be such that the arrangement is self-enforcing. We address this
commitment problem by imposing a ‘no defection ’ constraint in the first-stage o f the
problem.

Intuitively, a household would want to renege if the current gain from defection — not
making a transfer — is greater than the gain in expected lifetime utility from staying in
the arrangement.9 We assume that defection by either household triggers a break-down o f
the risk-sharing arrangement forever from that point onwards.10 Therefore, the no
defection constraint that we impose on each household’s optimization problem states that
the gain from defection in any given period should not exceed the future expected gain
from staying in the arrangement:

For household A,

(14)

and for household B,
(15)

9 It should be noted that the incentive to defect arises only when one is giving a transfer.
10 Such a trigger strategy works if the players presume there’s always a positive probability o f the game
continuing in the next period. We assume this is the case in our model.
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V and U represent the outside (status quo/exogenous) utilities A and B receive if the
insurance arrangement breaks down. Therefore, the left hand sides show the expected
gains from staying in the arrangement and the right hand sides represent the gains from
defection. S is a subjective discount factor that we assume is the same for both
households. Because o f the symmetric nature o f the problem and the choice o f a single
(same) transfer by both households, we characterize the optimization for household A;
the exact same implications apply for household B.

Thus, the first stage problem for A maximizes V ' subject to the no defection constraint in
(14).11 The first order condition for this problem is thus:

F^ { l + * X Z s ) - * v U f - ff«L)= °

( 16>

where Ais the multiplier associated with the no defection constraint. Let’s denote the
optimizing value as 0UL.

Proposition 2: 0UL < 0HL. That is, the optimal transfer under moral hazard and
enforcement problems is strictly smaller than that under moral hazard only.

P roof When the transfer amount equals 0UL, V f = 0. Thus at 0UL, the first term in (16) is
zero, and since A > Owhen the no-defection constraint is binding, the first-order condition
becomes negative. This implies 0ul < dUL. m

Proposition 2 has an intuitive appeal. One way to ensure that the risk-sharing contract is
self-enforcing is through reducing the gain from defection. Given income levels in the
two states, this is attained by lowering the transfer level required from the high income to
the low income household. Accordingly, Proposition 2 states that the optimal transfer

11 In doing so, we are trying to characterize the best/optimal contract that is self-enforcing. There may be
other (multiple) equilibria ( dlIL), in the sub-game perfect sense, that satisfy the no defection constraints but
are inferior in the sense of optimality in risk sharing.

15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

level under moral hazard only is too high for the contract to be self-enforcing.
Furthermore, since in proposition (1) we have shown that the transfer level under moral
hazard only is smaller than the first-best, this means that the inclusion o f a self
enforcement constraint (over and above moral hazard) drives the optimal transfer further
below the first-best level.

Furthermore, it can be shown that the left hand side o f (16) is positive at dHL = 0only if
the following holds:

f - 7 ' V "T

w

<17)

w herer = l + - ^
\-S
Under the assumption o f symmetric probability distributions given effort, (17) reduces to:

V'\Vh )
where

>1 + —
KT

k

= ^(l -

(18)

<j>),

and

<j>is

the generic distribution for the two households.

The condition in (17) implies that under moral hazard and enforcement problems, the
optimal transfer amount may be driven down to zero in some, although extreme,
situations.12 This occurs if the discount factor is very low (households are very
impatient), the disparity in incomes between the two states is low, or both. After all, these
are situations where concerns about risk sharing may not be significant.

It is also worth noting how optimal effort levels respond to the inclusion o f defection
concerns in addition to moral hazard. This leads to the next proposition.

12 (18) also reinforces our assertion above that under moral hazard only, the optimal transfer amount is
always positive. This happens because when there are no enforcement problems ( X = 0 ), (18) is always
satisfied.
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Proposition 3: The optimal effort levels under moral hazard and limited commitment are
higher than those under moral hazard only.

Proof: Follows from proposition (2) and Lemma (2). ■
Proposition (3) states that all is not sour when it comes to welfare concerns that arise
from limited commitment in risk-sharing contracts. A very interesting and surprising
result is that optimal effort levels under limited commitment and moral hazard are in fact
higher than effort levels under moral hazard only. This is because the transfer amount
under self-enforcement is smaller, thereby reducing the amount o f insurance provided in
the contract. This raises the incentive to undertake higher effort. This is interesting
because it implies that households’ prior knowledge o f the fact that they cannot rely on
outside parties to enforce contracts propels them to exert higher effort levels than they
would otherwise. That is, the “pricing” o f limited commitment into household decisions
partially counters the moral hazard problem. Figure 2 shows this phenomenon.

Figure 2: Effort Reaction Function Equilibria with Different Transfer Amounts
e

a
Conclusion
In their endeavor to shield consumption from idiosyncratic shocks to income, households
in poor economies often engage in risk-sharing arrangements. In urban (semi-urban)
areas the proper functioning of such arrangements is hindered by information and
contract enforcement problems. In this essay, a symmetric two household model is used
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to characterize the optimal insurance and effort levels in an income transfer arrangement
under information and commitment problems. The model provides insights into how
households balance their production (effort) choices with insurance concerns and how
risk-sharing arrangements may be modified and sustained even in the absence o f contract
enforcing legal institutions.

The results indicate that effort levels under risk sharing are inferior to the first-best and
decrease with ex post income transfers. Optimal insurance under double moral hazard is
also less than the first-best level. Moreover, the addition o f commitment problems further
reduces insurance. Interestingly, effort levels under moral hazard and enforcement
concerns are higher than effort levels under moral hazard only. It seems that the
commitment problem partially offsets the incentive problem that arises from risk sharing.
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ESSAY II
CONSUMPTION INSURANCE IN POOR URBAN AREAS
Introduction
The empirical literature on consumption insurance has mainly focused on rural areas o f
developing economies. The reason for such close emphasis on rural areas could be partly
methodological and partly conceptual. The methodological reason has mainly to do with
data availability. Given the intensive data requirements that characterize consumption
insurance

tests,

involving variables

like

household

income,

consumption

and

demographics, village-level targeted surveys have been the main source o f usable
information in the context o f developing countries. In addition, conceptually, it may be
more intuitive to comprehend risk sharing in the framework o f smaller, closely-knit
village level networks where the flow of information is relatively free. In such areas,
insurance instruments and communities are also apparently easier to identify.

Consequently, the extent to which households in poor urban economies can insure
consumption against income shocks is still largely open to scrutiny. Theoretically, in
addition to enforcement problems that arise due to the lack o f well developed legal
institutions, risk sharing in such areas also suffers from significant information problems
because o f the relatively loose societal structure. Such problems comprise adverse
selection due to the difficulty in observing idiosyncratic income shocks o f partnering
households, and moral hazard due to unobservable effort in production.

As noted above, studies have examined the degree of consumption insurance in rural
economies. Among others, Townsend (1994) finds that despite rejecting full insurance,
the correlation between idiosyncratic changes in income and consumption in Indian
villages was notably small after controlling for aggregate consumption. Ravallion and
Chaudhuri (1997) question Townsend’s findings and interpretations mostly on
econometric grounds. Deaton (1997) rejects consumption insurance in three villages in
Cote D ’Ivoire. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) find evidence o f a monotonic relationship
between the degree o f insurance and household wealth in rural China. Recently, such
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tests are also emerging for urban areas o f developing countries, particularly in the context
o f former socialist East European economies. Skoufias (2003) uses data from the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey and finds that consumption o f urban households seems
to be significantly less insured from income swings than that o f rural households. He also
reports that households use nonfood consumption as a buffer to protect food
consumption. Skoufias (2004) undertakes similar tests for Bulgaria and reports that
consumption is protected only partially from idiosyncratic income changes. As was the
case for Russia, households seem to protect food consumption by adjusting non-food
expenditures.13

This paper contributes to this literature by examining the degree o f consumption
insurance in poor urban areas. In particular, we use a rich, nationally representative
dataset from urban areas in Ethiopia. The dataset, called the Ethiopian Urban SocioEconomic Survey (EUSES), provides detailed information on household demographics,
migration, employment and income, consumption, health and welfare. It can be argued
that urban households in Sub-Saharan Africa are especially vulnerable to income risk due
to the particularly thin formal financial sector, even by other developing country
standards, and nonexistent public transfer and insurance programs.

We conduct tests mostly in the context o f the full insurance hypothesis which is widely
applied in the risk-sharing and insurance literature (see, among others, Cochrane, 1991
and Townsend, 1994). The tests primarily regress growth of household consumption on
own income growth and household taste shift determinants, after controlling for
aggregate shocks. If complete insurance exists, own income has no room in determining
consumption growth in such regressions. Related specifications are also estimated to test
for the presence o f partial insurance and to see the direct effects o f idiosyncratic shock
proxies.

13 For full-insurance tests in developed countries, see Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), McCarthy (1995) for
US; Barrientos (2003) for Britain; and Kohara (2001) for Japan. Altonji et al (1992) and Hayashi et al
(1996) provide tests at the extended family level for U.S. households.
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Least Squares and Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) estimations are employed to
conduct the tests. The GMM estimator is used primarily because o f a concern about
potential measurement errors in the main right hand side variable, income growth.
Largely, the results o f the tests provide strong support for the hypothesis that in poor
urban areas there are significant deviations from full-information insurance. Results also
suggest that partial insurance occurs among the most vulnerable and that households
seem to better protect consumption against unemployment than sickness related shocks.
The difference in coefficients using the two estimators also validate the concern
regarding measurement errors in income and hence the need to use estimators that control
for potential endogeneity in such regressions.

Conceptual Framework
A test o f whether or not households completely insure consumption against income
shocks can be done in the framework o f the full insurance hypothesis. The full insurance
hypothesis and the resulting empirical tests can be derived from a planner’s problem o f
the following form (see Cochrane, 1991; Deaton, 1997).

Imagine an economy with N households each having an intertemporal utility

U h = 'Z '£ d(nhy x (s ')u (c h(s'),*"(*'))
t

( 1)

s'

where uncertainty is depicted by a state variables with probability o f occurrences,
c h(s ')i s the consumption o f household/j in time periods when states occurs, a h(s')
depicts cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in preferences and 77* represents the
rate o f time preference.

Pareto optimal allocations are obtained from a planner’s maximization problem o f a
weighted sum o f households’ utilities:

23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

N

Max J ] mhJ Y , fo'*)' *(*' )u(ch( s ' ) , a h(s ‘)),
h=l

/= !

(2 )

j'

where the social weights mh may be based on the relative wealth positions o f households
in the initial period (and hence each household’s utility without the insurance scheme).
The Lagrangean o f the problem can be written as

where ^ ( s ') is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint that aggregate
community consumption equals aggregate endowment eAin each state san d tim et. The
first-order condition for the problem where individual consumption is the control can be
given as

07hy v huc( c \ s , ),cTh(s')) = Z (s')

(4)

w here%(s') is the ratio o f the Lagrange multiplierA(s') to the probability o f states,
x ( s ) , andwcis the marginal utility of consumption. Since the multiplier x ( s ‘) depends
only on aggregate consumption/endowment, individual endowments do not enter into the
determination o f individual consumption except through the fixed effect m h. Taking the
ratio o f the first-order conditions at two different periods to remove the fixed effect, we
get

h

U c ( Ct

)

uc{cU,*U)

_

Xt

x,-x

where the state subscripts are dropped since only one state is observed in each period.
The important implication o f (5) is that the discounted growth o f marginal utility is
constant across households and depends only on aggregate consumption.
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This proposes a simple test o f the full insurance hypothesis for given forms o f utility.
Suppose that households have a power utility with multiplicative preference shocks:
n(c*, <T*) = exp(<5cr,A) 1 (C/* )s
o

(6)

where (1 - S ) is the coefficient o f constant relative risk aversion. After taking logs and
rearranging, equation (5) becomes

logrjh +S((T, - cr,_,) - log

(7)
\Xt-\,

Therefore, in the presence o f complete risk sharing, the growth rate o f consumption o f a
household, net o f preference shocks, is a function o f only the growth o f aggregate shocks,
logix ,lx ,-i )-

Accordingly, the usually estimated empirical specification in the consumption insurance
literature takes the form:

A ln cf = a + >SAln y, + <pX* + e h
t

(8)

where A In _yf denotes the growth rate o f an individual household’s income. Under the
null hypothesis o f full consumption insurance (first-best outcome in a micro-model o f
risk sharing), fluctuations in a household’s income do not affect the growth rate o f its
consumption and henceP - Q . In (8), aggregate shocks are included in the constant
term a , and X is a vector o f variables that partly captures the preference variations across
households and over time. Measurement errors in consumption and taste factors that are
not accounted for by X are included in the error term s .

In general, as the sources o f random shocks to income are varied (e.g. sickness
precluding engagement in economic activity, involuntary job loss, death o f a member,
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accidental loss o f assets to fire etc.), so can the mechanisms that households employ to
shield consumption from those shocks. The main question that is posed here is: are the
risk-sharing mechanisms fully efficient in that, after controlling for aggregate resources,
consumption is completely protected from individual income changes?

Data
For our estimations, we use data from a nationally representative survey o f households in
urban Ethiopia. The survey, called the Ethiopian Urban Socio-Economic Survey
(EUSES), is collected by the Department o f Economics, Addis Ababa University,
Ethiopia in collaboration with Gotenborg University o f Sweden. It collects detailed
information

on

household

demographics,

migration,

employment

and

income,

consumption, health and welfare from seven major urban centers in the country. The
urban centers are Addis Ababa, Awassa, Bahir Dar, Dessie, Dire Dawa, Jimma and
Mekele. Each city is allocated a share o f participant households according to its
contribution to the total population. Accordingly, while Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and
Awassa were allocated 900, 125 and 75 households, the rest were allocated 100
households each. We use the first two rounds o f the survey, collected in September 1994
and December 1995, to do our estimations.

We consider three groups o f consumption expenditure to compute the growth rate o f
consumption: food, non-food and total nondurable, which is the sum o f food and
nonfood. Massive aggregations were needed to construct the two basic classes o f
expenditure. Food expenditure is a sum o f over 55 components o f different food types,
while nonfood expenditure is aggregated from over 30 types o f expenditures on
nondurables. As has been argued in the literature, durables were excluded from the
analysis (see Nelson, 1994).

Similarly, the construction o f total household income required significant aggregations
over different income sources. Specifically, we considered four potential sources o f
income for households in urban Ethiopia: wage/salary employment, own account/formal
business, informal female business and informal child business. Under each category,
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households were further inquired about secondary activities (like part-time jobs) they
may be engaged in and incomes from such sources are also included in the computation.
For all the analyses below, we use disposable income, which is income net o f taxes (for
households relying on wage/salary employment) and net of taxes and business expenses
(for those that earn business incomes). We present the analysis for three groups of
households based on the source o f income: (a) all households, allowing for incomes
derived potentially from all four major sources, (b) households that derive their income
from wage/salary employment only, and (c) households that derive their income from
wage/salary employment, female business and/or child business but not formal business.
We adopt this classification so that it is possible to reflect on the extent o f consumption
insurance by income source, and especially that of households that rely on formal
employment. The highly skewed income distribution that results from the inclusion o f
formal business operating households is also a concern that led to the above type
classification.

As given in equation (8), our main specification regresses consumption growth on
income growth and some controls for taste shifts. We include age o f the household head
and the change in household size between the two rounds as variables that partly capture
such preference shifts.14 Furthermore, we construct shock variables that could potentially
proxy for sources o f idiosyncratic changes in income. These are used for direct inclusion
in later specifications and some are also employed to instrument for income in
instrumental variable estimations. We try to capture such idiosyncratic shocks with
dummy variables on employment and health status changes that households experienced
between the two rounds. In particular, we construct dummy variables that identify
negative shocks. For example, an employment status change dummy equals one if a
household head was employed in the first round and is unemployed in the second round,
and equals zero otherwise. In this case, households whose heads were unemployed in the
first round are excluded. A health status change variable will have a similar structure and
equals one, for example, if a head reported illness in the second round without reporting
illness in the first. Regarding health, we also construct variables that partially measure the
14 These two are often used to partially control for taste shifts (see McCarthy, 1995; Skoufias, 2003).
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extent o f the shock. These are (a) the change between the two rounds in the number of
days o f sickness reported by the head (respectively, all members) in the month preceding
the survey, and (b) the change between the two rounds in the number o f days the head
(respectively, all members) missed work due to illness during the same period.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on important variables. It can be noted that for the
large sample including all households, mean income is much higher than mean total
consumption for both rounds. However, this is driven by the highly skewed distribution
o f income when business operating households are included in the sample. Actually, for
the sample excluding formal business operating households, mean consumption is greater
than mean income15. Moreover, for both rounds, expenditure on food items largely
outweighs expenditure on nonfood items. Income growth between the two rounds for the
full sample was 5% while total nondurable expenditure grew by 4%.

The average size household had about 6 members. The mean age o f a head was 47 years
and a third o f households were female headed. According to the definition above, the
proportion o f heads that experienced negative employment and health status shocks
between the two rounds was 5% and 11%, respectively. Conditional on at least one
member o f a household reporting sickness, the average total number o f days o f illness by
all members was about half a month.

15 The mean total consumption for the sample excluding business operating households was 757.6 Birr and
727 Birr for 1994 and 1995, respectively.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Important Variables for Consumption Insurance
Tests
N
Mean
Median
Variable_______________________________
Std. Dev.
Consumption-1994
781
Food
462.16
348.50
432.51
781
260.48
506.25
Non-food, nondurable
120.00
781
722.64
509.50
766.85
Total nondurable
Income-1994
781
All sources
1469.35
356.90 12398.47
480
Wage/salary only
617.56
372.45
1533.04
618
Wage/salary, female and/or child business
535.68
318.25
1372.66
Consumption-1995
781
Food
342.71
551.80
499.49
781
258.14
313.45
Non-food, nondurable
157.66
781
757.63
537.03
757.68
Total nondurable
Income-1995
781
375.00
5547.89
All sources
1194.69
402
573.82
Wage or salary only
417.71
534.07
562
334.64
1560.82
Wage/salary, female and/or child business
561.13
Growth of consumption
781
0.02
Food
-0.01
0.80
781
0.24
1.04
0.19
Non-food, nondurable
781
0.04
0.05
0.71
Total nondurable
Growth of income
781
1.30
Potentially all sources
0.05
0.10
365
0.75
Wage or salary only
0.02
0.09
525
0.01
0.09
0.99
Wage/salary, female and/or child business
Household size
781
2.67
1994
6.46
6.00
781
2.65
1995
6.29
6.00
781
12.73
47.45
46.00
Head’s age (1994)
781
0.33
Dummy for female headed households (1994)
Dummy for head’s employment status
781
1994
0.87
694
0.95
1995
Dummy for head’s health status
772
1994
0.86
740
0.88
1995
668
0.05
Dummy-change in head’s employment status
632
0.11
Dummy-change in head’s health status
Number of days head was ill
102
9.53
8.00
12.23
1994
100
9.81
13.14
8.00
1995
Number of days head missed work due to illness
71
8.91
7.00
11.11
1994
61
9.47
7.00
10.01
1995
Number of days all members were ill
238
13.76
13.00
16.05
1994
236
13.66
14.00
16.97
1995
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Number o f days members missed work due to illness

1994
1995

14.05
13.54

10.00
7.00

12.17
13.12

180
168

Note: Values are in Ethiopian currency (Birr) in 1994 prices. Dummy for female headed households=l if
female headed; dummy for head’s employment status=l if employed; dummy for head’s health status=l if
no illness reported; dummy for change in head’s employment status=l if head was employed in 1994 and
unemployed in 1995; dummy for change in head’s health status=l if head reported illness in 1995 without
reporting illness in 1994; Number of days of illness is conditional on at least one day o f illness reported.

Estimation Methods
We estimate equation (8) using two different estimators: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Instrumental Variables (IV) in Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) framework.
The need to also report IV-GMM estimates arises from concerns about an errors-invariables induced endogeneity problem involving the main right hand side variable,
income growth. If household income is measured with error (as is often the case with
micro-level income data), it results in the usual-type attenuation bias and inconsistency of
Least Squares estimates. For this we instrument for income growth and do GMM
estimation.

For an overidentified case where the number o f moment conditions (or instruments) K is
greater than the number o f parameters L, the GMM estimator minimizes the function

J(^ ,W ) = « g n(8)'Wg„(8)

(9)

where g„(8) is the sample analogue to the population moment conditions and W is a
symmetric and positive definite weighting matrix (Hayashi, 2000). For a linear gn(8), (9)
reduces to

J ( 8, W) = n •(sxy - S jy W f s ,, - SIZ8)

(10)

where Z is the matrix o f regressors, X is the matrix o f instruments (containing both
included and excluded instruments), and
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1 n
1 n
sxy = —V x j ■yi , Sxz s —V x j -z',and y, is the dependent variable.
(KxL)

n

i= l

(KxL)

n

f= ,

Consequently, the GMM estimator is given by

<?(W) = (S'xzWSM)-, S'IZWsxy

(11)

For a given weighting matrix W , the GMM estimator ^(W) is asymptotically consistent
and normal. It can also be shown that the GMM estimator attains minimum variance
when the weighting matrix is chosen such that

plim W = S 1 where S = E(g,g').

In this regard, we adopt the two-step efficient (optimal) GMM estimator. According to
this procedure, residuals from the first stage estimation are used to obtain a consistent
estimator o f S from which the optimal weighting matrix is constructed. The second step
makes use o f this weighting matrix to obtain a GMM estimator that is efficient in the
presence o f arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error term (Hayashi,
2000 ).

In reporting the IV-GMM estimates we also present Hansen’s test o f overidentifying
restrictions. The test is used to see the appropriateness o f the instruments as a group and
is based on estimated distance o f the minimum GMM function from the origin. The
associated test statistic, called the 7-statistic, is asymptotically Chi-squared distributed
with degrees o f freedom equal to number o f moment conditions (instruments) K minus
the number o f parameters to be estimated, L. Failure to reject the null hypothesis lends
support for the validity o f the instruments used and hence the consistency o f the GMM
estimator.
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Results
Table 2 presents estimates o f the effects o f idiosyncratic income change on household
consumption growth. The top panel shows the Least Squares results and the bottom panel
shows corresponding GMM results. Estimates are presented for the three types o f
consumption expenditure and for the three samples o f households: (a) households that
earn income from any one or more o f the four major sources, (b) those that earn
employment (wage/salary) income only, and (c) those that earn incomes from
wage/salary employment, female business and/or child business but not formal business.

The least squares results in the top panel o f Table 1 overwhelmingly reject the full
insurance hypothesis. Own income growth is a significant determinant o f consumption
growth in eight o f the nine regressions. Compared to the other two samples, the estimated
marginal propensities to consume (MPC) are higher for the second sample o f households
(those that earn employment income only). The coefficients are the smallest for the
sample including business-operating households. This may imply that households engage
in secondary income-generating activities to better smooth consumption and/or that low
income households are liquidity constrained which causes close correlation between
income growth and consumption growth.

Furthermore, for the non-business operating samples, estimated income coefficients are
higher for food consumption than nonfood consumption. This is in contrast to, for
example, what Skoufias (2003) found in similar tests for Russia. A potential explanation
for the higher coefficients on food consumption is the same liquidity constraint idea as
above. For liquidity constrained households where expenditure on food items constitutes
the largest budget outlay, growth in income may be closely followed by growth o f food
consumption.16

16 The result is more surprising since one expects a smaller income elasticity on food than nonfood items.
However, for these households food may not yet be a necessity, but rather a luxury. The issue of liquidity
constraints closely ties into this argument when nonfood items are second in preference ordering and are
purchased by these households only when deemed a necessity.
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Table 2: Effect of Idiosyncratic Income Change on Household Consumption: National Level
Constant
Age
Income growth
Income source
Change in
Dependent variable: A in
household size
I. Least Squares estimates
All sources
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Employment
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Except business
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
II. GMM estimates
All sources
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Employment
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Except business
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)

H ansen’s
J-statistic

N

0.061 (0.60)
0.374 (2.61)**
0.135 (1.43)

-0.002 (0.87)
-0.004(1.50)
-0.003 (1.30)

0.140 (5.97)**
0.099 (2.97)**
0.110(5.24)**

0.082 (3.60)**
0.083 (2.66)**
0.077 (3.53)**

781
781
781

-0.196(1.36)
0.071 (0.37)
-0.120 (0.96)

0.004(1.45)
0.003 (0.73)
0.004(1.45)

0.061 (2.02)*
0.099 (2.48)**
0.067 (2.89)**

0.216(3.54)**
0.125 (1.82)
0.182 (3.63)**

365
365
365

-0.048 (0.38)
0.294(1.87)
0.063 (0.57)

0.001 (0.31)
-0.002 (0.49)
-0.001 (0.08)

0.112(4.10)**
0.119(3.27)**
0.111 (4.98)**

0.141 (3.31)**
0.104 (2.78)**
0.123 (3.52)**

525
525
525

0.139(1.20)
0.363 (2.30)*
0.190(1.81)

-0.003 (1.33)
-0.004(1.21)
-0.004(1.62)

0.151 (5.99)**
0.094 (2.68)**
0.114(4.92)**

0.120 (4.12)**
0.093 (2.50)**
0.101 (3.86)**

2.081
1.961
2.790

661
661
661

-0.236(1.37)
0.006 (0.03)
-0.164(1.14)

0.005 (1.29)
0.005 (1.02)
0.005 (1.50)

0.072 (2.30)*
0.121 (2.75)**
0.081 (3.33)**

0.322 (4.23)**
0.178(1.81)
0.274 (4.37)**

0.734
0.071
0.231

300
300
300

-0.009 (0.06)
0.173 (0.99)
0.058 (0.46)

-0.001 (0.04)
0.001 (0.38)
-0.001 (0.01)

0.132 (4.32)**
0.108 (3.10)**
0.123 (5.21)**

0.193 (3.66)**
0.141 (2.50)**
0.174 (3.99)**

2.010
2.312
1.145

433
433
433

Note\ Asymptotic |t|-statistics are shown in parentheses. **-shows significance at 1% level; ’•'-shows significance at 5% level. Robust standard errors
are used for OLS estimation; the two-step efficient estimator is used for GMM estimation. The 5% Chi-square critical value with two degrees o f
freedom for Hansen’s J-test is 5.99.

As mentioned above, measurement errors in income could lead to inconsistent least
squares estimates and for this we also report instrumental variable estimates in a GMM
framework. The GMM estimates are presented in the bottom panel o f Table 2. The
instruments for growth o f income comprise variables for employment status change,
health status change and rank ordering o f income growth among households. As
explained earlier, employment status change is a negative shock dummy that takes a
value o f one if the head o f the household becomes unemployed between the two rounds.
The health variable is defined as the difference between the two rounds in the number o f
missed days o f work by all members o f the family due to illness. The rank variable is
used based on the assumption that although measurement errors affect values o f income
growth, they are not large enough to affect the ranking between households. By
construction, this rank variable is highly correlated with income growth. Due to missing
values encountered in the construction o f the employment and health variables, the GMM
regressions are done on smaller sample sizes.

The GMM estimates are qualitatively similar to the least squares estimates: again in eight
o f the nine regressions, consumption insurance is significantly rejected. However, the
estimated income coefficients using GMM are notably larger than the OLS estimates.
This applies for all consumption types and income source samples. The results, therefore,
substantiate the concern regarding measurement errors in income and the consequent
attenuation bias. The GMM estimates show very high marginal propensities to consume
out o f idiosyncratic income (for example, 32% in case o f food consumption for
households relying on wage/salary employment) but still keep the trends set by the Least
Squares estimates. Food consumption is more responsive to income changes than
nonfood consumption and households relying on formal employment income only seem
to be less well insured than the other two samples. The fact that estimated coefficients o f
the other variables are not as different from their Least Squares counterparts and the
systematic uni-directional (upward) increase in the income coefficients indicate that the
new higher marginal propensities to consume are not due to the change in samples
between the two panels. Importantly, the reported Hansen J-statistics are all below the
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5% Chi-square critical value with two degrees o f freedom indicating the validity o f the
instruments and hence the consistency o f the GMM estimates.

The rejection o f full consumption insurance as in Table 2 may not be surprising given
that the estimations are done at the national level. In developing countries, where formal
financial markets are thin and households often use informal village-level networks
instead, consumption insurance may still take place community-wise even if it is rejected
nationally. If this is the case, it implies that a household’s consumption is closely tied to
village-level average income rather than the national average, and controlling for the
former, own income may not play a significant role (Deaton, 1997). One way to test this
hypothesis is to run the above type regressions after allowing for community dummies.
Under the null hypothesis o f full consumption insurance at the community level, the
introduction o f such dummies should drive the own income estimates to zero.

For our case, we introduce community dummies at the Wereda level. In the Ethiopian
urban administration system, a wereda is the next administrative unit to the city. The
number and size o f weredas in a city varies depending on the size o f the city. For
example, o f the seven urban centers included in the survey, the capital city Addis Ababa
has 25 weredas while the smallest city, Awassa, has only 2 weredas. The choice o f
weredas as insurance communities provided the better compromise between the issues o f
identifying relevant communities for consumption insurance tests and the desired number
o f sampled households in each community/cell. Choosing the smallest administrative
unit, Kebeles, in many cases yielded too few sampled households per cell.

Table 3 presents results of the regressions with community dummies. Both the least
squares and GMM estimates show that we strongly reject the full insurance hypothesis
even at the community level. As was the case in Table 2, the income growth coefficients
are higher for food than nonfood consumption and households relying on employment
income only seem to be the least protected from idiosyncratic income shocks. However,
even though the MPCs reported in Table 3 also significantly reject consumption
insurance, they are slightly smaller than the corresponding coefficients in Table 2. Again
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the Hansen J-statistics show that the instruments used for the GMM estimation are
appropriate. GMM estimations for the second income sample are not completed because
o f too few observations in some dummy cells (communities).

The results in Table 2 and Table 3 provide conclusive evidence that we reject complete
insurance for urban households in Ethiopia, both at the national and village levels. This
can be potentially explained by the dearth o f financial sector services and the exacerbated
nature o f information and enforcement problems in urban (semi-urban) societies that
render informal risk sharing difficult. At this junction, given that full insurance is
rejected, a relevant question would be to ask if these households do in fact engage at least
in partial risk sharing. If there is partial risk sharing going on among households in a
village, there will be some role for changes in village income in explaining changes in
household consumption conditional on growth o f own income. For this we estimate the
equation,

A in c* = a + yff1A l n y , + /?2A l n y f + ^ X f +£•*

(12)

where Ain J, denotes the growth in average community income. The test is the converse
o f complete consumption insurance, and

> 0 implies that there is partial risk sharing

taking place between households (Deaton, 1997). In a purely autarkic world, there should
be no effect o f community income growth on individual consumption.

Estimation results for equation (12) are presented in Table 4. Again results o f both OLS
and GMM estimations are shown. It can be seen that for most specifications and both
estimators, controlling for changes in own income, growth of average community income
has no significant impact on the growth o f household consumption. The only exception
occurs in the case o f food consumption by households that earn wage/salary income,
where about a fifth o f the change in consumption is explained by the change in
community income. Given that based on the earlier results this was the group that seemed
the least protected from own income shocks, this may indicate partial insurance occurring
among the most vulnerable. In some o f the specifications the coefficient on average
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income growth is in fact negative. Largely, one can conclude that partial risk sharing is
not evident at the community level in urban Ethiopia.

Finally, Table 5 shows results o f regressions that include actual idiosyncratic shock
variables in place o f growth o f income.17 The variables are entered into the equation one
at a time. This is done to possibly infer which shocks households insure and which they
don’t. As long as these shocks are also directly transmitted into income shocks, they can
be proxies for income but without significant measurement errors. The control variables
remain the same as the previous ones and the dependent variable is total consumption.
Due to missing variables encountered in the construction o f dummy variables and the
resulting smaller sample sizes, estimations are done only for the first and third income
groups. As can be seen from the estimates, all variables except head’s employment status
enter the regressions with the expected negative sign. However, only change in head’s
health status and change in head’s number o f days o f illness (between the two rounds) are
found to be statistically significant.

17 Cochrane (1991) is a proponent of this approach to testing the ftill-insurance hypothesis.

37

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 3: Effect of Idiosyncratic Income Change on Household Consumption; with Community Dummies
Constant
Age
Income source
Change in
Income growth
H ansen’s JDependent variable: A in
household size
statistic
I Least Squares estimates
All sources
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Employment
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Except business
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
II. GMM estimates
All sources
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Employment
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Except business
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)

N

-0.038(0.21)
0.497(1.52)
0.051 (0.27)

-0.003 (1.37)
-0.004(1.46)
-0.003 (1.55)

0.123 (5.10)**
0.084 (2.55)**
0.092 (4.80)**

0.075 (3.29)**
0.085 (2.75)**
0.074 (3.48)**

781
781
781

-0.045 (0.49)
1.191 (8.84)**
0.294 (3.34)**

0.001 (0.24)
0.003 (0.69)
0.002 (0.64)

0.041 (1.33)
0.109 (2.42)*
0.060 (2.43)*

0.165 (2.89)**
0.127(1.60)
0.153 (3.03)**

365
365
365

0.081 (0.47)
1.180 (6.55)**
0.347 (2.58)**

-0.002 (0.53)
-0.001 (0.29)
-0.001 (0.57)

0.093 (3.37)**
0.122 (3.22)**
0.103 (4.53)**

0.120 (2.83)**
0.103 (2.48)**
0.108 (3.09)**

525
525
525

0.215(1.13)
0.440(1.18)
0.233 (1.24)

-0.005 (2.02)*
-0.004(1.28)
-0.005 (2.12)*

0.136(5.13)**
0.080 (2.31)*
0.097 (4.56)**

0.111 (3.82)**
0.088 (2.37)*
0.095 (3.67)**

1.749
3.250
2.665

661
661
661

0.294(1.19)
0.915(3.76)**
0.392 (2.09)*

-0.004(1.27)
0.003 (0.62)
-0.002 (0.77)

0.109 (3.44)**
0.110(2.84)**
0.110(4.40)**

0.160 (2.96)**
0.139(2.27)*
0.151 (3.38)**

0.253
5.251
0.904

433
433
433

Note: Asymptotic |t|-statistics are shown in parentheses. **-shows significance at 1% level; *- shows significance at 5% level. Robust standard errors are
used for OLS estimation; the two-step efficient estimator is used for GMM estimation. The 5% Chi-square critical value with two degrees o f freedom
for Hansen’s J-test is 5.99.
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Table 4: Effect of Idiosyncratic Income Change and Community Average Income Growth on Household Consumption
Age
Change in
Comm.average Own income
Income source
Constant
Hansen’s N
household size
Dependent variable: A in
income growth growth
J-stat.
I. Least Squares estimates
All sources
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Employment
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Except business
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
II. GMM estimates
All sources
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Employment
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)
Except business
ln(food)
ln(nonfood)
ln(nondurable)

0.062 (0.60)
0.368 (2.57)**
0.133(1.41)

-0.002 (0.87)
-0.004(1.50)
-0.003 (1.30)

0.140 (5.96)**
0.100 (3.03)**
0.111 (5.27)**

0.006 (0.20)
-0.056(1.72)
-0.015(0.61)

0.082 (3.54)**
0.088 (2.82)**
0.078 (3.60)**

781
781
781

-0.189(1.31)
0.068 (0.36)
-0.116(0.93)

0.004(1.47)
0.003 (0.72)
0.004(1.46)

0.060 (2.00)*
0.099 (2.48)**
0.067 (2.87)**

0.185 (2.07)*
-0.072 (0.55)
0.089(1.13)

0.182 (2.86)**
0.139(1.84)
0.166 (3.13)**

365
365
365

-0.050 (0.39)
0.295(1.87)
0.061 (0.56)

0.001 (0.34)
-0.002 (0.51)
-0.001 (0.06)

0.111 (4.05)**
0.120 (3.27)**
0.111 (4.97)**

0.080(1.24)
-0.040 (0.48)
0.046 (0.83)

0.130(2.94)**
0.110(2.77)**
0.117(3.24)**

525
525
525

0.143 (1.23)
0.346(2.19)*
0.187(1.77)

-0.003 (1.35)
-0.004(1.15)
-0.004(1.61)

0.151 (6.00)**
0.095 (2.73)**
0.114(4.94)**

0.021 (0.68)
-0.084 (2.16)*
-0.016(0.59)

0.118(4.06)**
0.101 (2.73)**
0.102 (3.94)**

2.037
2.229
2.833

661
661
661

-0.231 (1.34)
-0.001 (0.00)
-0.159(1.09)

0.005 (1.35)
0.005(1.02)
0.005 (1.52)

0.073 (2.30)*
0.121 (2.76)**
0.081 (3.31)**

0.236(1.97)*
-0.093 (0.62)
0.116(1.14)

0.282 (3.58)**
0.195(1.85)
0.253 (3.86)**

0.942
0.040
0.246

300
300
300

-0.008 (0.05)
0.169 (0.97)
0.058 (0.45)

-0.001 (0.03)
0.001 (0.38)
-0.001 (0.01)

0.131 (4.28)**
0.111 (3.14)**
0.123 (5.19)**

0.036(0.41)
-0.131 (1.25)
-0.012(0.17)

0.188 (3.41)**
0.159(2.66)**
0.176 (3.93)**

2.067
2.240
1.129

433
433
433

N ote: Asymptotic |t|-statistics are shown in parentheses. **-shows significance at 1% level; *- shows significance at 5% level. Robust standard errors are
used for OLS estimation; the two-step efficient estimator is used for GMM estimation. The 5% Chi-square critical value with two degrees o f freedom
for Hansen’s J-test is 5.99.

Table 5: Effect of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Household Consumption
____________________________________ Coefficient (t)
N________ N for dummy=l
A ll Incom e Sources

A head’s employment status
A head’s health status
A head’s no. of days of illness
A head’s work days lost to illness
A members’ no. of days of illness
A members’ work days lost to illness

0.148(1.17)
-0.243 (2.57)**
-0.006(1.53)
-0.004 (0.76)
-0.001 (0.48)
-0.002 (0.71)

668
632
781
781
774
774

36
70
173
118
395
302

0.057 (0.42)
-0.242 (2.18)*
-0.012 (2.50)**
-0.008(1.29)
-0.001 (0.07)
-0.001 (0.10)

439
432
525
525
519
519

26
49
113
74
258
192

E xcept B usiness Incom e

A head’s employment status
A head’s health status
A head’s no. of days of illness
A head’s work days lost to illness
A members’ no. of days of illness
A members’ work days lost to illness

Note-. The dependent variable is growth of total nondurable consumption. All regressions also include age
o f the household head and change in household size between the two rounds as explanatory variables. |t|
statistics are given in parentheses. ** shows significance at the 1% level; * shows significance at the 5%
level. OLS estimation with robust standard errors is used. Change in head’s employment status is a
dummy=l if head was employed in 1994 and unemployed in 1995; change in head’s health status is a
dummy=l if head reported illness in 1995 without reporting illness in 1994. The other variables are: the
change between the two rounds in the number of days of illness reported by the head (respectively, all
members) in the month preceding the survey; and the change between the two rounds in the number o f days
the head (respectively, all members) missed work due to illness in the month preceding the survey. The last
column of the table shows the number o f households in the relevant sample where dummy=l (in case of
dummy variables) and the number of households with non-zero values of the idiosyncratic shock measure
(in case o f the count variables).

Conclusion
Poor urban households seem to be precariously positioned when it comes to protecting
consumption from income fluctuations.

This is primarily because risk-sharing

arrangements in these areas are likely to suffer from significant information problems, in
addition to lack o f enforcement, that adversely affects performance. The empirical
evidence focusing on poor urban areas is rather scarce, making definitive inferences
regarding performance difficult.

This essay contributes towards filling this gap in the literature. It uses extensive survey
data from poor urban areas to assess how effective households are in insuring
consumption. Results indicate that full insurance is forcefully rejected for various
consumption types and income source groups, with estimated marginal propensities to
consume as large as 32%. Further tests show that partial insurance seems to happen
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among the most vulnerable; and that unemployment related shocks seem better insured
than sickness induced ones. Overall, the observed significant deviation from full
insurance for almost all specifications is consistent with the prediction o f a risk-sharing
model with information and enforcement problems.
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ESSAY III
PRIVATE TRANSFERS, INFORMAL LOANS AND RISK SHARING AMONG
POOR URBAN HOUSEHOLDS
Introduction
The average household in the poor regions o f the world is often faced with consumption
risks that result from income and related shocks. In rural areas, such shocks include
weather calamities that negatively affect crop production, adverse price shocks, loss o f
crops to pests, sickness or death o f the household head or other working members,
unexpected ceremonial expenses etc. In urban areas, income swings are often associated
with the incidence and duration o f unemployment, sickness o f earning members and
impending medical expenses, flailing business income for business operating households
etc. Accordingly, while households in both rural and urban areas may be exposed to
certain common types o f shocks, some other risks can be peculiar to the social, livelihood
and production structures prevailing in the specific community. Nevertheless, faced with
various sources o f income risk, it is reasonable that households strive to protect
consumption through different means, formal or informal, and across time and space.

The question o f how well households cope with and share risk has been at the forefront o f
the risk sharing literature, mostly in the context o f rural areas o f developing economies.
But most o f the empirical tests have been aggregate, consumption based (see for
example, Townsend, 1994; Deaton, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999). The hypothesis in
these tests is that if households efficiently share risk, controlling for aggregate
community income, changes in individual income should not have a significant effect on
consumption. The particular mechanism(s) (or instruments) that households adopt for
risk-sharing purposes is not apparent from such an approach (see Alderman and Paxson,
1994; Cox and Jimenez, 1998; Fafcahmps and Lund, 2003, for similar observations).

Knowledge of the actual means o f insurance used by households, which are likely to be
informal in nature for most poor regions o f the world, has policy relevance o f multiple
dimensions. For instance, if interhousehold transfers and informal loans are the primary
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means through which households cope with risk, and they are found to be reasonably
efficient, it may be the case that public insurance programs simply substitute these
mechanisms with little or no gain in net social welfare. In fact, given the informational
advantages that such households have (in assessing the magnitude and source o f risk)
relative to an outside principal, public insurance may even be less efficient. On the other
hand, if appropriate tests reveal that households self-insure through, say, accumulation o f
liquid and non-liquid assets, and that only relatively wealthy households are able to do so,
targeted public insurance for the liquidity-constrained poor households may be
efficiency-enhancing.

This paper contributes to a growing literature that investigates the mechanisms o f risk
sharing among poor households. There are two aspects o f the paper that are particularly
relevant in the context o f the literature. First, it focuses on poor urban areas. The
disproportionate focus in the literature on rural households has meant that we know
relatively little about the risk-sharing practices o f poor urban households. Given that
formal insurance is largely absent in urban areas o f most developing economies, it is
apparent that these households may be no less vulnerable to income risk than their rural
counterparts. Furthermore, because o f lack o f survey data, the little we know about risk
sharing between poor urban households has come from small, targeted surveys. The use
o f a nationally representative urban survey data in this study is particularly appealing in
this regard.18 Second, the study uses information on both private transfer and informal
loan activities to assess whether each mechanism serves risk-sharing purposes. The
simultaneous treatment o f both potential instruments sheds light on relative performance,
and also highlights idiosyncrasies that affect household participation in either (or both)
mechanisms.

The literature has noted that, in the absence o f formal insurance, poor households often
devise various means o f pooling risk. It has been documented that within and inter
household transfers in the form of remittances and gifts are used for consumption

18 Recent studies of East European economies have used survey data (see for instance, Skoufias, 2003 and
Skoufias, 2004 for Russia and Bulgaria, respectively).
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smoothing purposes by rural households in Botswana and India (Lucas and Stark, 1985;
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Rosenzweig, 1988). Informal loans with zero or small
interest, no collateral and contingent repayment serve insurance purposes in the face of
shocks and income variability (Udry, 1990, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003).
Households also accumulate savings and assets to run down in times o f uncertainty and
hardship (Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). In other evidence, households
engage in income smoothing activities prior to the occurrence o f shocks. Examples o f
such measures include crop diversification and choice o f low return-low risk varieties by
farming households (Dercon, 1996) and involvement in off-farm activities (Kochar,
1999; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Labor and resource sharing is still another route
households take to help each other in times o f need (Platteau, 1997).

The nuances o f urban living imply that risk sharing in poor urban areas can be a distinctly
different exercise than that in rural areas. Cox and Jimenez (1998) argue that it is difficult
to judge a priori whether poor urban settings suit risk-sharing practices better than rural
ones. Proximity and relative occupational uniformity significantly mitigate information
problems in rural areas and promote risk-sharing arrangements. However, these same
characteristics imply that rural households are subject to the same aggregate risk, which
renders risk sharing ineffective, while urban households are not. Urban risk sharing, in
contrast, is infected with significant moral hazard and adverse selection problems, even
more so because o f the relatively loose social structure that worsens information
problems.

The data reveal that transfers and loans in urban Ethiopia are largely informal, often
transacted between relatives and friends. They are also primarily used to augment
nondurable (especially food) consumption, supporting the hypothesis that they may be
among the main instruments o f consumption smoothing. The regression results further
show that private transfers in urban Ethiopia significantly respond to presumed proxies o f
income risk. Unemployment o f the head, female headship and in some cases sickness
increase the probability o f net transfer receipts. In contrast, informal loans do not seem to
respond to any o f these shocks. This latter result may imply that such loans, though

46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

informal, have very much the characteristics o f formal loans where repayment
considerations factor in; hence nullifying their potential use as instruments o f insurance.
The results suggest that altruistically motivated transfers, compared to informal loans,
better serve risk-sharing purposes in urban Ethiopia. Informal loans promote
consumption smoothing without facilitating risk sharing.

Data
Source
The data for the analyses in this paper come from the Ethiopian Urban Socio-Economic
Surveys (EUSES) conducted by the Department o f Economics, Addis Ababa University,
Ethiopia in collaboration with various national and international institutions. 19The
nationally

representative

surveys

collect

extensive

information

on

household

demographics, employment and income, consumption, migration, transfer and credit
activity, health and welfare from households residing in seven major urban centers in the
country. Each urban center is allocated a share o f participant households in the survey
according to its contribution to the total population. Accordingly, while Addis Ababa (the
capital city), Dire-Dawa and Awassa were allocated 900, 125 and 75 households,
respectively, the other four cities (Bahir-Dar, Dessie, Jimma and Mekele) each
contributed 100 households. Four rounds o f the survey conducted between 1994 and
2000 are available to date.

For the current study, we use data from the first three rounds o f the survey, collected in
September 1994, November 1995 and January 1997. These rounds have a strong panel
structure, tracking the same households whenever possible. In constructing our sample,
we dropped households that reported operating formal businesses. We believe that such
households have a structurally different income source composition and attitude towards
risk from the average household.20 Regardless, the random sampling ensures that all

19 The Collaborating institutions are Institute of Development Research, Ethiopia (1994 round); the then
Ministry o f Economic Development and Cooperation, Ethiopia and Michigan State University (1995
round); University o f Goteborg, Sweden (1994, 1997 and 2000 rounds).
20 Since pre-transfer income and activity choice are considered exogenous for our analysis, this will not
cause a sample selection problem.
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income groups are represented in our sample. After data cleaning and dropping
households with missing values for important variables, the final sample for this study
consists o f 2504 observations. This final sample derives information from 1202
households, each household contributing at most 3 observations, whenever available.

The unit o f analysis for the current study is the household. However, the design o f the
surveys is such that most o f the relevant questions were asked at the member level. As a
result, enormous aggregations were required to arrive at household level values for
important variables like income, private transfers and informal loans.

Private Transfers and Informal Loans
As noted above, the primary objective o f this paper is to investigate whether private
transfers and informal loans serve as instruments o f risk sharing among poor urban
households. We focus on these mechanisms for two reasons. First, public insurance and
formal credit services (especially for consumption related purposes) are barely available
in poor urban economies. Second, since revealing (and verifying) vulnerability to
consumption risk is generally difficult, closely-knit relationships that can resolve the
associated moral hazard and adverse selection problems provide potentially thriving
means o f insurance.

We define private transfers and informal loans primarily based the source o f receipts.
Transactions that take place with resident and non-resident household members, friends,
relatives, neighbors etc. are considered private (informal) and are included for analysis.
Local administrations, the government and non-governmental organizations (for
transfers), and banks and credit associations (for loans) constitute formal sources and the
associated transactions are excluded for the purposes o f this paper. The amounts analyzed
include both cash and value o f in-kind transfers and loans.

Table 1 provides summary statistics on participation in private transfer and informal loan
activities by urban households in Ethiopia. Statistics on amounts o f transfers and loans
conditional on participation are also presented. The transfer and loan summaries are
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based on activities in the 12 months prior to the survey month. The income statistics refer
to monthly amounts. The figures in the table show that about 31 percent o f households in
the sample reported involvement in some type o f transfer activity; a third o f the sample
reported participation in similar loan exchange (as recipients, givers or both; figures refer
to the pooled sample). The participation statistics reveal that households are much more
likely to receive than give transfers. This is even more so in the case o f loans. Average
annual net transfer receipts (defined as transfers received minus transfers given) amount
to 3.5 times mean monthly income. The comparable figures for loans are much less,
however, whereby the mean annual net loan receipt (defined as loans received-loans
repaid-loans given+ repayments received) is about half of average monthly household
income.21 While most o f the participation figures are comparable across years, the
average transfer and loan magnitudes for 1995 are remarkably smaller than those for
1994 and 1997. The relatively large standard deviations accompanying the means also
show that there is a large degree o f variation in income, transfer and loan flows between
households.

Sources o f private transfers and informal loans are summarized in Table 2. As the
responses to the transfer and loan questions were recorded at the member level, the
statistics are based on receipts by individuals residing in the final sample o f households.
It is shown that an overwhelming majority o f transfers involve inter-household
transactions among relatives and friends. ‘Other’ (consisting o f dowry, inheritances and
unspecified) sources contribute less than 1% o f total transfer receipts.22 The same is true
for loan receipts; 80 percent o f loan exchange takes place between friends, relatives or
neighbors. Informal networks— referred to as equb and iddir/mahber, rotating savings
and credit and insurance associations, respectively— are sources to less than 3% o f total
loan receipts.

21 If we assume net receipts are evenly distributed across months, average monthly transfer and loan
receipts represent 30 percent and 5 percent of average monthly income, respectively.
22 Given that the focus is on private transfers, those from governmental and non-governmental
organizations, which often take the form of food aid, are excluded from the analysis. In the original sample,
such transfers amounted to about 13% of total transfer receipts.
23 In a similar manner, since the focus here is on informal loans, formal loan receipts are excluded from the
analysis. However, a look at the original sample shows that loans from formal sources like banks and credit
associations contribute to a very small proportion (about 8%) of total loans receipts.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Income, Transfers and Loans (Proportions, Means
and Standard Deviations)__________________________________________________
1997
1994
1995
Variable
Pooled
486.98
394.10
Income
416.12
387.26
(1348.20
(1890.93)
(1441.42)
(1146.06)
Transfers
Transfer status
33.23
Any transfer activity
30.51
29.01
30.19
23.95
26.53
23.88
22.14
Received transfers
9.55
10.73
Gave transfers
9.90
9.64
Transfers amount
1245.76
2490.50
Transfers received
2073.74
2424.93
(2019.34)
(5814.46)
(5496.84)
(6933.05)
554.84
Transfers given
494.26
532.31
422.81
(750.78)
(985.49)
(555.74)
(759.39)
819.75
1808.79
Net transfers received
1462.73
1710.14
(5350.95)
(4975.02)
(1977.17)
(6150.62)
Loans
Loan status
29.21
37.45
Any loan activity
33.15
32.44
34.52
26.83
Received loans
29.10
30.19
4.92
4.97
Gave loans
5.67
6.68
Loans amount
178.24
211.82
Loans received
272.67
392.49
(503.21)
(527.29)
(1901.72)
(2925.97)
224.23
132.58
Loans given
166.08
149.49
(564.74)
(339.52)
(545.54)
(613.47)
172.21
134.56
Net loans received
219.95
321.31
(500.25)
(558.26)
(1668.53)
(2525.23)
671
N
2504
1048
785
Note: Proportions are given in percentages. Amount statistics are conditional on involvement in transfer or
loan activity. Transfers and loans are given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr. N corresponds to total size o f the
pooled or yearly samples.

A summary o f the reasons for transfer and loan receipts is presented in Table 3. Again
these statistics are based on available responses by residents in the final sample o f
households. More than 2/3 o f private transfer receipts by urban households in Ethiopia
are intended for food consumption. Similarly, based on counts, about 47% o f informal
loans are used to augment food consumption. In case of loan receipts, however, the
weighted statistics show that loans taken for nonfood-nondurable consumption (like
educational, health, travel and rental expenses, etc.) are much larger in magnitude than
those intended for food consumption.
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Overall, Tables 2 and 3 reveal that private transfers and informal loans indeed serve
consumption smoothing purposes. It appears that the scarcity o f formal sources o f
insurance and credit, and the informational advantages that are present in closely-knit
relationships, compel households to rely on private transfers and informal loans as
instruments o f insurance. In the next section, we further examine the issue based on
regression analysis.

Table 2: Transfer and Loan Sources
Unweighted
Transfers
Nonresident household member
Relative or friend
Other
N
Loans
Money lender
Friend, relative or neighbor
Informal network
Other
N

Weighted

25.76
73.90
0.34
885

32.26
67.55
0.19
885

4.26
80.72
1.60
13.42
939

5.52
79.90
2.89
11.68
939

Note: Statistics are based on household member-level transfer and loan transactions. The weights are
transfer or loan amounts given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr.

Table 3: Transfer and Loan Reason
Use
Food consumption
Nonfood-nondurable consumption
Durable consumption
Business expenditure
Saving related
Ceremonial expenses
Other
N

Transfers
Unweighted Weighted
69.28
68.68
8.01
15.01
4.24
5.79
1.18
6.48
2.36
6.79
6.97
846

5.20
846

Loans
Unweighted Weighted
47.26
22.36
25.84
22.28
16.57
12.59
31.32
11.30
4.09
2.48
929

2.83
1.08
929

Note'. Statistics are based on available household member-level transfer and loan transactions. The weights
are transfer or loan amounts given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr.

Specification
This section investigates, using econometric evidence, whether households in poor urban
areas share risk through the use o f private transfers and informal loans. The hypothesis is
that if households use either or both potential channels o f informal insurance, net positive
flows should occur to households experiencing negative income shocks. In this regard,
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one would ideally like to obtain a measure o f (unexpected, transitory) income variability
and examine its correlation with the direction o f net transfer and loan flows. Given the
available information in the EUSES and that we only have at most three data points per
household, we are not able to generate an exogenous measure o f income risk to include as
an explanatory variable.24

Lack o f a direct measure o f income variability may be a caveat o f the study. However, we
argue that it is also very difficult for partnering households to reveal (and verify) the
nature o f idiosyncratic income variations. That is, income changes per se may be poor
signals for risk-sharing purposes anyway, and are unlikely to determine transfer and loan
flows, if indeed the latter serve risk-sharing practices. This is especially true for urban
areas. While households in rural areas can fairly objectively assess the seasonal harvests
o f a neighboring farming household, the varied occupational undertakings by urban
households imply a similar exercise is likely to be difficult.25

Consequently, we argue that, empirically, transfer and loan flows may be dictated more
by readily observable signals of vulnerability to consumption risk than idiosyncratic
income changes.26 Such signals constitute age composition o f a household, female
headship, employment status, number o f working members, health status etc. The
hypothesis is that if private transfers and loans fulfill risk-sharing purposes between
urban households, those households exhibiting characteristics that are often positively

24 In the welfare section o f the surveys, households were asked to give the nature/direction o f income
change that they have experienced (within the past three years for the 1994 round, and since the previous
survey for the 1995 and 1997 rounds). Unfortunately, the definition o f ‘income’ in the respective question
is not clear, and it is worrisome that households could impute net transfer, loan and other unearned income
in their subjective calculation of income change. We experimented with the use o f the variable as a proxy
for income shocks, but our worry seems to have been proven in that the estimated coefficient had the
‘wrong sign’ (i.e. positive income changes were positively correlated with net transfer receipts) and was not
statistically significant in almost all specifications.
25 A similar comparison between urban and rural households can be made when it comes to the difficulty
involving revelation and verification o f effort in production. This problem is potentially much more severe
in urban areas because of the large variations in employment types and human capital. A similar point was
made by Cox and Jimenez (1998). The relatively loose societal structure in urban compared to rural areas is
another reason for a more significant moral hazard problem.
26 This is more true for transfers. If informal loans are pure credit, repayment considerations factor in to
determine flow patterns.
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correlated with vulnerability to consumption risk are more likely to be net recipients,
ceteris paribus.

To test this hypothesis, we estimate separate incidence equations for transfer and loan
•

receipts.

27

The explanatory variables that are used in the estimations are summarized in

Table 4. The statistics reveal that the average household in the sample consists o f 5.7
members. A somewhat surprisingly large proportion (42 percent) o f households were
female headed, while the mean age o f heads was about 49 years.28 Heads have 5 years o f
schooling on average, while the mean years o f schooling of all members above 15 years
o f age is 6.7 years. A fifth o f heads were unemployed. A similar proportion reported
having disabilities half o f which are chronic. About 15% of heads reported experiencing
sickness in the four weeks prior to survey date (see Appendix for definition and
construction o f variables).

We argue that female headship, head’s unemployment, head’s disability, number of
workers and, to some extent, head’s sickness are relatively conspicuous signals of
vulnerability to income shocks. Number o f workers potentially shows income source
diversification and increased ability to self-insure. Female headship and head’s disability
signal the opposite. Unemployment and sickness o f the head reveal negative income
shocks. Controlling for number o f workers, household size shows increased consumption
needs. We control for age and human capital composition o f the household to capture
liquidity constraint and life-cycle effects (see Cox et al, 1998, 2004, among others). Pre
transfer income is the main variable scrutinized in the motives for transfer— altruism
versus exchange— debate in the literature (Cox, 1987; Altonji et al., 1997).

27 Presumably due to the significant noise in transfer and loan data, it is common to observe much better
determined estimates for incidence (discrete choice) equations than OLS using amounts (see Cox and
Jimenez, 1998 for a similar observation, and Kuhn and Stillman, 2004 for a comparison of estimates).
28 A potential explanation for the large proportion of female headed households is that many women may
have experienced separations from or death of husbands in the prolonged civil war that ended in 1991. It
has also been noted that reintegration of ex-soldiers has been difficult in urban compared to rural areas
(Dercon and Ayalew, 1998).
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Table 4: Summary Statistics on Explanatory Variables (Means and Standard
Deviations)_________________________________________________________
Explanatory Variable

Household size
Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head disabled
Head chronically disabled
Head sick
N

Pooled

1994

1995

1997

5.70
(2.67)
0.42
49.21
(13.68)
5.42
(5.36)
6.66
(3.47)
1.52
(1.05)
0.22
0.20
0.10
0.14
2504

5.86
(2.73)
0.40
48.00
(13.28)
5.53
(5.40)
6.77
(3.58)
1.54
(1.06)
0.21
0.23
0.12
0.16
1048

5.67
(2.68)
0.43
49.00
(13.95)
5.36
(5.31)
5.36
(5.31)
1.50
(1.01)
0.20
0.17
0.08
0.14
785

5.48
(2.58)
0.44
51.33
(13.73)
5.33
(5.34)
5.33
(5.34)
1.51
(1.06)
0.24
0.19
0.08
0.13
671

Based on the categorization o f households into three groups— as net givers, neither net
givers nor net recipients, and net recipients— we estimate an ordered probit model for
transfers and loans separately. Assume that z*h represents the latent variable that
determines the transfer (loan) net receipt status o f household h . The latent variable z \

is

given by a linear function:

zh ~ XhP &h
+

>

where Xy, denotes a vector o f household characteristics and shock proxies, J5 represents
a vector o f regression coefficients, and Sf, denotes an error term which is assumed to be
distributed standard normal.

Assume Z h represents the observed categorical variable for transfer (loan) net receipt
status. Z h is then related to the latent variable z \

according to the following:

Z h = -1 if z*h < kx,
Z h = 0 if K\ < z*h < tc2 , and
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Z h = 1 if z*h > *2 •
Z f j - - I , Z h - 0 and Z h = 1 represent net giver, neither net recipient nor net giver, and
net recipient status, respectively. The cut-off points ( a c ’s ) are estimated along with the
regression parameters (Maddala, 1983; Long, 1997).

Distribution o f the pooled estimation sample based on net transfer (loan) receipt status is
presented in Table 5.29It is shown that the proportion o f net recipients is significantly
larger than that o f net givers. This may show that a few, relatively better-off households
carry a significant burden o f responsibility for the provision o f transfers and loans. In the
case o f transfers, it may also highlight the role played by remittances received from non
domestic sources. For the third category o f households that are neither net givers nor net
recipients, we do not distinguish between households that were not involved in receiving
and/or giving at all and those that have net zero values because o f canceling out. This is
especially noteworthy in case o f loans as 16% o f observations that belong to this category
were involved in loan activities but have fully paid loans received (or received full
payments for loans given). This provides further evidence that households may indeed
use informal loans to relieve transitory negative pressures on income and consumption.

Table 5: Distribution of Estimation Sample based on Transfer and Credit Receipt
Status
Credit

Transfers

Status
Net givers
Neither net-givers nor net-recipients
Net recipients
N

Count
180
1741
583
2504

Frequency
7.19
69.53
23.28
100.00

Count
101
1995
408
2504

Frequency
4.03
79.67
16.29
100.00

Note: Distribution corresponds to the pooled sample.

29 For both transfers and loans, the pooled sample reflects a very similar distribution to the ones obtained
for the cross-section of households (i.e. by year). The proportion o f net recipients o f transfers is comparable
to what other studies that rely on national survey have reported (see for example, Cox et al, 1998, for urban
Peru, and Kuhn and Stillman, 2004 for urban Russia). Using Philippines data for private transfers, Cox et al
(2004) present a much larger proportion of households that are net recipients (about 80%), but net givers
accounted for about 10% o f the sample.
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Results
The ordered probit estimates are presented in Table 6. We first discuss the results for the
estimations done on the pooled sample. The estimates for the transfer equation show that
female headship and head’s unemployment increase the likelihood o f being a net transfer
recipient while number o f workers/earners in the household decreases it. Increase in
income also makes households less likely to be net recipients. Household size, head’s age
and human capital composition have no effect on the probability o f net receipts.
Similarly, temporal sickness and permanent disability, even chronic, seem to have no
effect.30 In general, the estimates seem to conform to the risk-sharing hypothesis. If
increases in income and number o f earners in the family are positively correlated with
household’s ability to self-ensure (and, generally, a more stable income stream), they lead
to a reduced dependence on or need for transfer receipts. Head’s unemployment, which is
a more visible signal for negative pressures on income and consumption, is found to be
positively associated with transfer receipts. The same effect is seen for female headship,
which could be a perceived indicator o f increased vulnerability to income risks.31The
coefficients on head’s unemployment and female headship are such that each increases
the probability o f net receipts by approximately 10 percentage points.32

The estimates for the loan equation show two significant differences to those o f the
transfer equation: female headship and head’s unemployment do not affect loan receipts
and actually the latter has the opposite sign. Presumably, repayment capacity o f potential
recipients may be an important determinant o f the decision to give (and maybe even to
request) loans. Furthermore, household size has a positive and significant effect on the

30 Estimations that included regional dummies resulted in almost identical estimates. Furthermore, as a
group, the regional dummies were never significant.
1 Some studies argue that female headship, by construct, should be highly correlated with transfer receipts
because it shows husbands that have migrated in search of work and remit cash regularly (Cox et al, 2004;
Cox and Jimenez, 1998). This is especially true when considering rural households and countries with
significant international migration (e.g. the Philippines in case of Cox et al, 2004). None o f these two is the
case in this study. One may further argue that there can be significant migration to the capital city, Addis
Ababa, from the other urban centers. In this case though, we should expect the proportion o f female heads
to be larger in the other urban areas compared to the capital. However, a breakdown o f the female headship
statistic by region shows that it is comparable across urban centers and hovers around the survey-average.
32 If we run the regressions again after dropping the variables with insignificant coefficients, the computed
marginal effects for net receipts for female headship and unemployment are about 12%.

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

likelihood o f loan receipts. Considering that we are controlling for household income and
number o f workers, this indicates that household size may have additional worth as
visible collateral. It could also show a reason to borrow as household size is positively
correlated with increased consumption needs. Income, head’s schooling and number o f
workers decrease the likelihood o f loan receipts, holding everything else constant. The
lack o f significant effect o f income risk proxies like head’s unemployment and female
headship implies that informal loans may not serve risk-sharing purposes in these areas.

Table 6 also presents results using a random effects ordered probit estimator. This is
performed to check whether the results discussed above are robust to controls for
household heterogeneities. It can be seen that, for both the transfer and loan equations,
the random effects estimates generally confirm the pooled estimates with a couple o f
notable exceptions. When we control for household effects, income is no more
statistically significant in the transfer equation and is significant at only 10% in the loan
equation; and that female headship and unemployment in the transfer equation have
larger effects compared to the pooled estimates. The difference in results is intuitive. In
the risk sharing equation, income should not matter when there are observable shock
variables, and looses its significance as a proxy for other household-specific effects in the
presence o f controls for the latter. For loans, however, income remains relevant (though
at the 10% level) because it represents household resources, which in turn determine the
demand for loans for consumption smoothing purposes.

To further analyze the determinants o f receiving and giving, and examine the presumed
symmetry that should exist, we also estimate separate probit equations for transfer (loan)
receipts and giving. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Again we report pooled
as well as random effects estimates. The results in Table 7 show that female headship,
unemployment and sickness (in the random effects specification) are associated with
larger probability o f receiving transfers. Household size causes the probability to decline.
Notably, increased head’s schooling improves the likelihood o f transfer receipts. The
loan receipt probit results are also shown in Table 7. As was the case in the ordered probit
specification, the income risk proxies like unemployment, sickness and female head have
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no effect on the likelihood o f loan receipts. This further confirms that informal loans may
not be an effective means o f risk sharing for the poor in urban Ethiopia.

The probit estimates for transfer (loan) giving are shown in Table 8. Comparing the
results in Tables 7 and 8, one can observe remarkable symmetry between the net transfer
recipient and net giver equations. The variables with significant coefficients in the net
transfer giver equation—female headship, head’s schooling, number o f workers and
head’s unemployment—all but head’s schooling have reversed signs compared to the
corresponding coefficients for net receipts. The only exception is head’s schooling. In
general, better head’s schooling seems to increase participation in transfer activity; that
is, it is associated with higher probability o f giving as well as receiving. This may be
indicative o f the relative ease with which better educated heads can form (or join) risksharing networks than less educated ones. It can also show better networking
opportunities afforded by more educated heads (e.g. educated heads are likely to be civil
servants in large government institutions where forming friendships and similar networks
may be easier). As can be seen in Table 8, no coefficient came out significant in the loan
giver pooled or random effects probit estimates. Appropriate tests show that the
component o f total variance explained by the random effect statistically collapses to zero
thereby explaining the nearly identical estimates for the pooled and panel samples.

Overall, based on the regression results, one can conclude that private transfers serve
risk-sharing purposes in urban Ethiopia while informal loans do not. Interestingly, the
contrasting results for the two potential mechanisms o f insurance could highlight a more
subtle but important distinction between ‘risk sharing’ and ‘consumption smoothing’.
Private transfers respond to income risk proxies and enable risk sharing, thereby
smoothing the consumption o f unfortunate households (at least partially). But
consumption smoothing can operate without risk sharing. Informal loans do not respond
to income risk proxies, which rules out their relevance for risk sharing, but they do
respond to indicators o f household resources like income and number o f workers, and
resource needs like household size. Therefore, households that need to augment current
consumption due to a variety o f reasons (e.g. holiday celebrations, purchase o f durable
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goods, impending ceremonies like weddings, child birth, educational and travel expenses
etc.) and lack the resources to do so could seek loans to fulfill their needs. This is
precisely what is borne out in the descriptive statistics. In Table 2, it is shown that what
can be

largely

categorized as

‘non-insurance’ items

(e.g.

nonfood-nondurable

consumption, durable consumption, business expenditure, ceremonial expenses etc.)
constitute about 25 percent o f the reasons for transfer receipts and 50 to 75 percent
(unweighted and weighted statistics) o f the reasons for loan receipts. As such, fixed, short
term informal loans smooth consumption without necessarily serving risk-sharing
practices.
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Table 6: Ordered Probit Estimates: Dependent Variable-Net Transfer Receipts or
Net Loan Receipts_______________________________________________________
Net loan receipts

Net transfer receipts

Variable
Income
Household size
Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s age squared
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head sick
Head chronically
disabled
*1
k2

Log-likelihood
2

W ald-^ (11)

Pooled

Random effects

Pooled

Random effects

-0.263 x l 0"1***
(2.51)
-0.172 x l O'1
(1.56)
0.328***
(5.31)
-0.1 10X 10'1
(0.96)
0 .1 8 3 x 1 0'3*
(1.70)
-0.518 x lO '2
(0.61)
0.465 x l O'2
(0.44)
-0.766X 10'1***
(2.66)
0.337***
(5.19)
0.448 x lO '1
(0.60)
-0.907 x lO '1
(1.11)
-1.626
(5.40)
0.693
(2.31)
-1855.83
181.26

-0.190X 10-4
(0.90)
-0.208 x lO '1
(1.38)
0.412***
(4.70)
-0.118
(0.75)
0.209 x lO '3
(1.42)
-0.854 x lO '2
(0.77)
0.650 x lO '2
(0.46)
-0.835 x lO '1**
(2.28)
0.435***
(4.79)
0.771 x lO '1
(0.88)
-0.105
(1.00)
-1.932
(4.61)
0.920
(2.20)
-1806.39
155.28

-0.358 x 1O'4***
(3.22)
0.345 x lO '1***
(2.87)
0.573 x lO '1
(0.88)
-0.133 x lO '2
(0.11)
-0.311 x lO -4
(0.29)
-0.160X 10'1*
(1.80)
-0.145 x lO '1
(1.31)
-0.933 x lO '1***
(3.17)
-0.754 x lO '1
(1.07)
-0.206 x lO '2
(0.03)
0.195**
(2.21)
-2.044
(6.31)
0.736
(2.31)
-1491.76
58.88

-0.373 x 1O'4*
(1.78)
0.364X 10'1***
(2.64)
0.571 x lO '1
(0.73)
0.194X 10'3
(0.01)
-0.485 xlO-4
(0.36)
-0.169X 10'1*
(1.67)
-0.165 X lO '1
(1.26)
-0.986X 10'1***
(2.89)
-0.838 x lO '1
(1.03)
-0.177 x l O'1
(0.21)
0.213**
(2.09)
-2.205
(5.80)
0.847
(2.25)
-1482.06
44.27

Notes: N=2504. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **shows significance at 5%; *-shows significance at 10%.
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Table 7: Probit Estimates: Dependent Variable-Net Transfer Recipient or Net Loan
Recipient_________________________________________________________________
Variable
Income
Household size
Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s age squared
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head sick
Head chronically
disabled
Constant
Log-likelihood
W ald -J2 (11)

Net transfer recipient
Pooled
Random effects
-0.341x10"*
-0.265 x 10"*
(1.37)
(0.62)
-0.411 XlO1***
-0.467 xlO'1**
(3.08)
(2.31)
0.408***
0.599***
(5.64)
(5.10)
-0.644 xlO-2
-0.615 xlO'2
(0.51)
(0.30)
0.174X10'3
0.218X10'3
(1.49)
(1.17)
0.198X10'1**
0.255 xlO'1*
(2.04)
(1.72)
0.173 xlO'1
0.234X10'1
(1.40)
(1.27)
-0.158 xlO'1
-0.240 xlO'1
(0.46)
(0.49)
0.381***
0.523***
(5.29)
(4.60)
0.110
0.179*
(1.35)
(1.65)
-0.133
-0.160
(1.35)
(1.20)
-1.120***
-1.674***
(3.31)
(3.03)
-1274.14
-1220.75
163.37
106.48

Net loan
Pooled
-0.192X10'3***
(2.74)
0.408 xlO'1***
(2.98)
0.308 xlO'1
(0.40)
-0.787 xlO'2
(0.58)
-.649 xlO'6
(0.01)
-0.113X10'1
(1.09)
-0.831 xlO'2
(0.63)
-0.793 xlO'1**
(2.08)
-0.849 xlO'1
(1.02)
0.228 xlO'1
(0.26)
0.193*
(1.89)
-0.557
(1.53)
-1088.25
41.85

recipient

Random effects
-0.212X10'3***
(2.85)
0.453 XlO'1***
(2.67)
0.274 XlO'1
(0.28)
-0.691 xlO'2
(0.38)
-0.263X10"*
(0.15)
-0.138X10'1
(1.07)
-0.103 xlO'1
(0.63)
-0.839X10'1*
(1.85)
-0.987 xlO'1
(0.97)
0.846 xlO'2
(0.08)
0.205*
(1.71)
-0.688
(1.44)
-1074.59
37.46

Notes: N=2504. Dependent variable is (a) for transfers: net transfer receipt=l if net transfers received >0,
zero otherwise (b) for loans: net loan receipt=l if net loans received >0, zero otherwise. Asymptotic |t|
statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *shows significance at 10%.
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Table 8: Probit Estimates: Dependent Variable-Net Transfer Giver or Net Loan
Giver
Net transfer giver

Variable
Income
Household size
Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s age squared
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head sick
Head chronically disabled
Constant
Log-likelihood
2

Wald-2" (11)

Net loan giver

Pooled

Random Effects

Pooled

Random Effects

0.290x10"**
(1.92)
-0.183 x lO '1
(0.95)
-0.228**
(2.08)
0.274 x lO '2
(0.13)
-0.596 xlO"*
(0.28)
0.416X 10'1***
(3.08)
0.250 x lO '1
(1.32)
0.162***
(4.18)
-0.279**
(2.10)
0.133
(1.06)
0.112X 10'1
(0.07)
-2.014***
(3.91)
-575.14
114.91

0.288X10"*
(1.15)
-0.167X 10'1
(0.81)
-0.245**
(1.98)
0.166X10'2
(0.07)
-0.502x10"*
(0.22)
0.463 XlO'1***
(3.08)
0.257 x lO '1
(1.24)
0.169***
(3.58)
-0.301**
(1.99)
0.130
(0.94)
0.276 x lO '1
(0.16)
-2 179***
(3.69)
-573.01
94.64

-0.691 x lO '5
(0.38)
-0.116X 10'1
(0.56)
-0.114
(1.00)
-0.167 x l 0 '1
(0.77)
0.113 x lO '3
(0.54)
0.163 x lO '1
(1.02)
0.284 x lO '1
(1.42)
0.737 x lO '1
(1.55)
-0.207 x lO '2
(0.02)
0.955 x lO '1
(0.68)
-0.235
(1.22)
-1.542***
(2.83)
-407.276
35.58

-0.691 x lO '5
(0.16)
-0.116X10-'
(0.54)
-0.114
(0.93)
-0.167 x lO '1
(0.77)
0.113 x lO '3
(0.53)
0.163X 10'1
(1.08)
0.284 x l O 1
(1.35)
0.737 x lO '1
(1.48)
-0.207 x lO '2
(0.02)
0.955 x lO '1
(0.67)
-0.235
(1.15)
-1.542***
(2.77)
-407.28
30.17

Notes'. N=2504. Dependent variable is (a) for transfers: net transfer given=l if net transfers given >0, zero
otherwise (b) for loans: net loan given=l if net loans given >0, zero otherwise. Asymptotic jt| statistics are
shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows
significance at 10%.

Conclusion
Based on nationally representative survey data from poor urban areas, we investigate
whether households use private transfers and informal loans for risk-sharing purposes. A
break-down o f reported uses o f transfer receipts shows that they are primarily intended
for augmenting food consumption; loan receipts are mostly used for nondurable
consumption, food plus nonfood. However, results from pooled and random effects
ordered probit estimates indicate that transfer receipts, not loans, respond to the presumed
income risk proxies. We explain loan flows as serving desired consumption goals that are
mostly unrelated to insurance.
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As transfers seem to serve risk-sharing purposes, there is a possibility that the provision
o f public insurance potentially changes private incentives and simply substitutes private
insurance. In situations o f aggregate risk, however, private transfers are not effective and
well-timed public insurance programs would be much warranted. The development of
insurance and financial markets in such economies also provides households, at least
those that may not engage in transfer arrangements for a variety o f reasons, alternative
ways to protect consumption during adverse idiosyncratic income shocks.
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable
Definition/Construction
Net transfer receipts
Gross private transfers received minus gross private transfers given
Net loan receipts
Total loans taken-repayments made-loans given+ repayments received
Income
Pre-transfer income earned from one or more of the following sources:
wage/salary employment, informal female business, informal child
business
Household size
Number of household members currently residing in the household
Female headed
Dummy variable=l if head is female
Head’s schooling
Years of schooling completed by head
Average schooling
Average years of schooling completed by all household members above
the age of 15
Number of workers
Number of household members involved in income-earning activity
Head unemployed
Dummy variable=l if head is unemployed
Head disabled
Dummy variable=l if head reported having a disability
Head chronically
Dummy variable=l if head’s reported disability is chronic (e.g. very
disabled
poor or complete loss of eye sight)
Head sick
Dummy variable=l if head reported experiencing illness in the month
prior to the survey
Note\ Transactions considered include both cash and in-kind transfers and loans. Transfers, loans and
income are all reported in real 1994 Ethiopian birr.
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